A mid-range conflict alerting system is proposed, based on a measure of criticality which directly takes into account the uncertainty in the prediction of the aircraft positions. The use of randomized algorithms makes the computation of the criticality measure tractable. The performance of the algorithm is evaluated by Monte Carlo simulation on a stochastic ODE model of the aircraft motion.
Introduction
The increasing demand for air travel is stressing the current, mostly human operated, Air Traffic Management System (ATMS). It has been suggested that an increase in the level of automation in future ATMS may alleviate some of this stress, by improving the efficiency of the system and simplifying the tasks of the human operators, while improving -or at least maintaining -the current level of safety. Safety is typically quantified in terms of numbers of conflicts, that is situations where aircraft come closer to one another than a certain desired minimum distance. To prevent conflicts an automated ATMS has to be able to perform conflict detection (predict the position of aircraft in the future to determine if conflicts are possible) and conflict resolution (modify the plans of the aircraft to prevent the conflicts). Currently, these functions are performed manually by the pilots and air traffic controllers (ATC), sometimes with the assistance of partial automation tools ( 
for example CTAS [l] and TCAS [2]).
Conflict detection and resolution schemes can be clas- function is carried out by ATC. The prediction algorithm proposed here is based on a probabilistic model for aircraft motion introduced in [5] . The model provides probability distributions for the future positions of the aircraft, based on their current positions and their flight plans. The distributions are used to compute the maximum probability of conflict over a 20 minutes horizon. If the probability exceeds a certain threshold a conflict is declared. Computational complexity and the requirement for real time implementation make it difficult to directly apply this procedure in practice. To keep the problem computationally tractable, we use randomized algorithms to obtain an estimate of the probability of conflict, as well as theoretical bounds on the level of the approximation involved.
The performance of our algorithm is evaluated by Monte Carlo simulation. Since the prediction model is somewhat inaccurate, the simulation is based on a more detailed, stochastic ODE model for the motion of the aircraft. The simulation results are also used to tune the parameters of the algorithm, in an attempt to optimize the tradeoff between probability of successful conflict detection and probability of false alarm. 
p!-p!-,
The configuration, y, of the N, aircraft system consists of the flight plans of all aircraft, y = { {Pj}y&, { v j }~~i }~i .
We assume that the flight plan of each aircraft is known, except of course the way point encoding the current position, which depends on how well the aircraft is tracking the flight plan. The models introduced below assume that an aircraft turns instantaneously and heads for the new way point at the scheduled time, even if it has deviated from its flight plan. This assumption is somewhat unrealistic, but is used in the prediction model to simplify the computation. It can be easily relaxed for the validation model, if better models for the way aircraft execute turns become available.
Prediction model
The actual position of the aircraft is affected by uncertainty, due to wind and errors in tracking, navigation, and control. Following 
The standard deviation of the horizontal cross track component, grows linearly with the distance traveled and then saturates at a fixed value:
Finally, the standard deviation of the vertical cross track component, remains constant:
The values c1 = 5011850 nmi, cz = 0.25 nmi/min, c3 = 1/57, c4 = 1 nmi, and c5 = 3011850 nmi were proposed in [5, 61, based on empirical air traffic data. Since the uncertainty components are assumed to be independent, the covariance matrix for t E [Tj-l, 2';) is given by:
where we set R E SO(3) for the rotation matrix R(Bj,df) associated with the angles 8; and 7r/2 -4;
that the vector Pj -Pj-l makes with the x1 and 23 axes of the global coordinate frame in which the Pj's are given.
This model is fairly accurate for mid-range conflict prediction, as it reflects the fact that pilots tend to correct cross track errors in the short term and deal with along track errors in the long term, using small changes in speed [5] . The accuracy of the model is limited by the assumption that the positions of the aircraft are uncorrelated. Since the tracking noise is primarily due to wind, the positions of the aircraft may in fact be correlated, especially near the conflict point where they are close one to the other. We are currently investigating ways of relaxing this assumption.
Validation model
The prediction model is simple and allows fast computations, but has inherent limitations, which limit its applicability for simulation and validation. To remove some of these limitations we introduce a stochastic ODE model and use it to generate aircraft trajectories for validation. The validation model provides a formal way of correlating the positions of a single aircraft at different points in time.
Consider an aircraft moving in R3, and let x denote its position with respect to a global inertial coordinate frame. Assume its velocity has magnitude ZI and makes an angle 9 with respect to the X I axis and 1r/2 -q5 with respect to the x3 axis. Consider a body coordinate frame x = [XI x 2 x3IT with XI aligned with the aircraft velocity (along track), x 2 perpendicular to it and lying on the plane on which the aircraft flies (cross track horizontal), and x 3 perpendicular to xi and ~2 (cross track vertical) (Figure 1 ). The two frames are related through the coordinate transformation where R ( 6 , 4 ) is the rotation matrix and p denotes the position of the origin of the body frame with respect to the inertial frame. p can be interpreted as the nominal position of the aircraft, x as its actual position, and x as the variation of the aircraft position with respect to the nominal one along the tracking directions.
The nominal position p evolves according to: We assume that the uncertainty in the position around the nominal point is obtained through the ODE:
where
Combining equations (1)- (3) produces the kinematic model
where (w, WO, w4) are the linear and angular velocities.
The above equations describing the aircraft motion are nonlinear. To make them linear we can adopt the simplification wg _= w$ 0, and model turns as discrete events occurring at the way points. This leads to a piecewise linear stochastic ODE: for t E [Tj-l, Tj), 
-N(O,V,(t)).
The initial conditions and the noise processes for different aircraft are assumed to be independent.
Position estimates y E R3 for each aircraft are obtained every A seconds through radar measurements (typically A = 12). We set
where the noise {E(kA)}k2o is described as a sequence reaches 86% of the saturation value in about 6 minutes. Ideally, the value of a3 should be set based on the estimate of the correlation between the aircraft positions at different time instants, as it does not affect any other relevant statistics. Since this piece of information is not available in the literature, we arbitrarily set it equal to 1 nmi-l. Currently dJ1 = 5 nmi for enroute airspace and 3 nmi in the TRACON, and dv = 2000 f t above 29000 f t and 1000 f t below 29000 f t . The conflict set is then given by C = {(ul,UP,U3) E R3 : (U?
Conflict detection consists of extracting some measure, C(y), of how safety critical the current configuration, y, is, comparing this measure to a threshold, P , and declaring a conflict if P is exceeded. The process should be repeated every time y changes, that is when a new measurement comes in from the radar, the ATC changes a flight plan, etc.
Algorithm 1 (General Conflict Detection) when y changes do Compute C(y)
In this paper we use the maximum of the probability of conflict over a horizon T as a measure of criticality*. Consider two aircraft, 1 and 2, let x1 and x 2 denote their positions in the inertial reference frame. Given the probability density function f(u, t ) for the separation u(t) = d ( t ) -z 2 ( t ) of the two aircraft at time t , the probability of conflict at time t is given by
s,
For the prediction model of Section 2.2, the predicted separation of two aircraft at time t is a Gaussian ran-
dom variable with mean p ( t ) = pl(t) -p 2 ( t ) and covariance matrix Q ( t ) = @ ( t ) + Q2(t). We set C(7) = S U~~~[~,~] PC(t)
, and, following [5] , T = 20 minutes.
The major obstacle in the implementation of Algorithm 1 is the computation of C(y), since one can not derive an analytical expression for PC(.). In the literature techniques for estimating C(y) have been proposed using Monte Carlo simulation [6] and analytical approximation [5] . We propose an algorithm for approximating C(y) based on the theory of empirical processes [9].
Estimation of C(y)
Suppose for the time being that we are able to compute
PC(t) with no error. Let Q be the uniform distribution on [O,T], and consider the following algorithm for computing an estimate, C'(y), of C(y).

Algorithm 2 (Randomized Estimate of C(y))
Choose an integer N and set C'(y) = 0
we are testing just N values of PC(t). In addition, the quality of the approximation is random due to the stochastic selection of the ti's. Nevertheless, if the random extractions are independent, it can be shown that C' is a good approximation in a probabilistic sense. 
Theorem 1 (Estimation of C(y))
Estimation of PC(t)
Next, we introduce a method for computing a uniformly good approximation of PC(t) over a finite set of time instants {tl, t z , . . . , t r~} .
Recall that PC(t) is the measure of the fixed set C according to N ( p ( t ) , Q ( t ) ) . By an appropriate change of coordinates, however, it can also be viewed as the measure of a time dependent set, C t , according to the standard normal dis- tribution N(0, I ) . The required change of coordinates can be found by computing the Cholesky fac-
(t)L(t)T of the covariance matrix, and setting w = L(t)-l[u -p ( t ) ] .
We then get
L ( t ) w + p ( t ) E C}. This suggests the following algorithm for probabilistically estimating PC(t).
Algorithm 3 (Randomized Estimate of PC(t))
Choose an integer M and set PC'(t) = 0
Iexpression denotes the indicator function. Again,
PC'(t) = &
IWjEct is a random approximation of PC(t), due to the stochastic selection of the wj's.
Under the assumption that the random extractions are independent, the following result quantifies the level of approximation involved. 
Theorem 2 (Estimation of PC) Fix
Hence, each finite collection of sets {Ct,}~v=, has the property of uniform convergence of empirical probabilities since for each fixed E the estimates uniformly convergences to their true values as the number of samples M goes to infinity.
Randomized Conflict Detection
The following algorithm brings the two procedures toget her.
Algorithm 4 (Randomized Conflict Detection)
Fix P E [0,1] and e , p, and 6 E (0,l) 
A conflict is declared if and only if the estimate -M exceeds the threshold P . Under the assumption that all the random extractions are independent, the following theorem characterizes the accuracy of our approximation.
Theorem 3 (Approximate estimation of C(y))
Given E , p, and 6 E ( O , l ) , C'(y) is an approximate estimate of C(y) to accuracy 2e and level ,b with confidence 1 -S an the sense that
with probability greater than 1 -S.
Notice that the number of samples needed to achieve a certain approximation level is independent of the nature of the sample space and of the probability distribution. In particular, the computational load does not significantly increase in the 3D case with respect to the 2D case. This is not the case if one resorts to numerical methods based on gridding or to approximate analytic methods such the one in [5] .
Validation and Tuning
The performance of the conflict detection scheme was evaluated using a three step process:
1. Given the flight plans of two aircraft, generate trajectories and radar measurements over a 20 minutes horizon using the discretized version of the validation model.
2.
For every value of the -discretized -threshold:
a. Execute the detection algorithm at every radar measurement time.
b. Compute the probability of false alarm P(FA) (fraction of declared conflicts that did not materialize) and the probability of successful alert P(SA) (fraction of conflicts declared at least 60 seconds before they occur).
Plot the System Operating Characteristic (SOC)
curve and choose the optimal threshold P.
The SOC is a plot of P(SA) versus P(FA), parameterized by the threshold. In principle, the more the SOC curve approaches the point (0, l), the better the performance of the system is likely to be. P is typically chosen to correspond the point on the the SOC curve closest to (0, l), in an attempt to achieve an "optimal" compromise between P(FA) and P(SA) [lo] .
To ensure our results are reasonable, we compare the performance of our algorithm with the algorithm of [5] , which is based on the same description of the uncertainty. The measure of criticality used by [5] is the probability of conflict at the point of the minimum nominal separation. An estimate for this quantity is computed for the 2D case by an analytical overapproximation of the integral of the probability density function for the separation. To compare the two algorithms we also restrict our algorithms to the 2D case, and to simple crossing encounters, parameterized by the path crossing angle 4 (deg), the minimum nominal separation dmin (nmi), and the nominal time tmin (min) to &in. The speeds of the aircraft are kept fixed (VI = 480 nmi/h and 212 = 500 nmi/h). Tables l and 2 summarize the values of P(FA) and P(SA) corresponding to the optimal threshold for different encounter situations computed by running the two detection algorithms ( E = 0.05, 6 = 0.1, p = 0.05). Note that when the minimum nominal distance is 0 nmi, in some entries of Table 1 and 2 P(SA)=l, whereas the optimal P(FA) is not defined. The reason is that for dmin = 0 nmi there is almost always a conflict, therefore, the optimal threshold is determined by maximizing P(SA), and there are not enough samples to get a statistically significant estimate of P(FA).
Both algorithms give a similar value for P(SA), but P(FA) is lower with our algorithm. The reason for this is that the measure of criticality used in [5] is an over approximation of the probability of conflict at tmin.
Different configurations lead to different SOC curves and therefore to different optimal thresholds. In [5] the threshold is set using heuristic arguments. We choose the threshold based on the optimal thresholds corresponding to Table 1 typically turns out to be the most interesting case, since the cases dmin = 0 nmi and dmin = 10 nmi correspond to extreme situations in which either a conflict almost always occurs or there is a negligible number of conflicts, respectively. Setting P = 0.85 leads to the values of P(FA) and P(SA) reported in Table 3 . We are currently working on a sensitivity analysis of the dependence of P on the flight plans to allow us to choose appropriate values for P for the typically encountered configurations. Other aspects that should be taken into account in this process are the detection of conflict a certain amount of time before it occurs and the prediction of its occurrence time. These aspects highly influence the effectiveness of a prediction/resolution scheme involving the human-in-the-loop component.
1.
2.
the explicit separation between the probabilistic models used for prediction and validation, and the use of randomized algorithms to manage the computational complexity of the problem and to provide quantitative estimates of the level of approximation involved.
I I
I tmin I Table 3 : P(FA)/P(SA) with P=0.85 for our algorithm
Besides developing methods for choosing the conflict detection threshold, we are currently working on formulating algorithms for conflict resolution for multiple aircraft, using model predictive control techniques and stochastic optimization. In parallel, we are working towards a methodology for formally evaluating the safety properties of the proposed algorithm. This will hopefully lead to a more general probabilistic verification methodology for hybrid systems.
